Losing the Zero-Sum Game

With a salary cap on what each team can pay their players in the NFL, compensation becomes a "zero-sum game" meaning if you overpay for one player that limits what you can pay another player, and what funds a team has available to acquire additional players.

During Coach Joe Gibbs 1.0 success, there was no salary cap, so at times, over paying star players or compensating valuable role players well-beyond what other teams were willing to do at that time to keep the core of the team together, turned out to be a winning strategy with four Superbowl appearances and three Championships during that era.

When Gibbs took over the Redskins the second time, he never seemed to fully grasp the salary cap, and the need to get value for every dollar he was committing to a player. During his first tenure, the fact that he way over paid an aging Mark Brunell wouldn't have been a big deal. But in the Gibbs 2.0 seasons, it was a disaster, saddling the team with under-performing quarterback who was also taking up nearly 10% of the total funds allocate for salaries for the entire team.

With this zero-sum game in mind, let's take a look at how the Redskins are currently spending their money, and which players are worth their contracts based on their average annual compensation over the course of the contract. Salaries that are considered "worth it" are compensation that I would be willing to pay that player for 2015 based on their on-field production for the 2014 season.

Those placed in the marginal category, are worth considering for 2015, unless the team can significantly upgrade or get better value for the money.

Those labeled as bad contracts shouldn't even be considered for the 2015 roster at their 2014 price tag.

In total, the sum of the bad contracts ($62.3 million) is greater than the good contracts and the marginal contracts combined ($57 million). Meaning that the Redskins wasted over half the money they spent on player salaries in 2014, which would surely place the Redskins near the league lead in this dubious category.

Also interesting to note is that of the 17 players earning more than $2 million per year, only four clearly earned their money in 2014, while 10 contributed so little, that they shouldn't even be considered for the 2015 roster at the same level of compensation.

And perhaps most disturbing to Redskins fans and the future of the team, of these ten, 7 were signed to their contracts after the end of the 2013 season, firmly the responsibility of President and GM Bruce Allen. Weigh that against Allen's limited positive contributions (two solid draft picks in Trent Murphy and Bashaud Breeland, and the signing of DeSean Jackson), and it is easy to see why there is so little confidence that the current front office's ability to turn around the team's on-field fortune any time soon.
     
Worth it  (18 players, totaling $31 million)

Trent Williams          $10,000,000
DeSean Jackson            6,000,000
Darrel Young                1,323,000
Alfred Morris                  555,000
Bashaud Breeland            676,000
Keenan Robinson            630,000
Colt McCoy                     795,000
Jordan Reed                     690,000
Chris Baker                   3,000,000
Ryan Kerrigan               2,180,000
Trent Murphy                1,118,000
Nick Sundberg              1,000,000
Roy Helu                         627,000
Ryan Grant                      608,000
Niles Paul                        555,000
Will Compton                  496,000
Kai Forbath                      480,000
Tress Way                        465,000

Marginal  (14 players, totaling $26 million)

Pierre Garcon             $8,500,000
Robert Griffin III          5,279,000
Kory Lichtensteiger      3,500,000
Jarvis Jenkins                1,195,000
Logan Paulsen               1,333,000
David Amerson                962,000
Morgan Moses                 793,000
Adam Heyward              1,000,000 
Spencer Long                    715,000
Kirk Cousins                     643,000
Frank Kearse                     615,000
Tom Compton                   480,000
Phillip Thomas                  465,000
Chris Thompson                495,000

Bad Deal (18 players, totaling 62.3 million)

Andre Roberts            $4,000,000
Barry Cofield                6,000,000
Jason Hatcher               6,875,000
Stephen Bowen            5,500,000
Chris Chester               4,000,000
DeAngelo Hall             4,250,000
Shawn Lauvao              4,250,000
Perry Riley                    4,000,000
Brian Orakpo               11,000,000
Tracy Porter                   3,000,000
Kendric Goldston           1,100,000
Josh LeRibeus                   714,000
Leonard Hankerson           680,000
Tyler Polumbus              1,000,000
Ryan Clark                     1,020,000
Brandon Merriweather   1,000,000
E.J. Biggers                       795,000
Santana Moss                 1,020,000

2008 Draft Still Haunts Redskins

It has been six years since the 2008 draft, the years those drafted players should have had a significant impact on the fortunes of the Redskins. But instead of providing a large group of "core Redskins" in their prime years, the 2008 draft class produced almost nothing.

The 2008 draft was billed as one with little top-flight talent but one loaded with depth, with a bunch of good players ready to be taken throughout the first few rounds.

The lack of top-end talent was borne out by the first three picks -- offensive tackle Jake Long, defensive end Chris Long, and quarterback Matt Ryan, all nice players, though none of which have had a anything close to a transformational impact on their teams.

Things seemed to get off to a good start for the Redskins when General Manager Vinny Cerrato was able to trade a package of picks including #21 in the first round for two additional second rounders. As it turns out, the second round was loaded with future Pro Bowlers, and the Redskins were now sitting with three second-round selections.  

The Redskins entered the draft looking to upgrade their receivers, their offensive and defensive lines, and their secondary. Three of the four positions where the Redskins are still have average to below average talent on their roster six years later.

In 2014, from a 2008 draft class of 10, the Redskins have grand total of ZERO players remaining on their roster. And in the intervening years, the major contributions from this entire class consisted of one good year from tight end Fred Davis, and one solid stretch at linebacker from Rob Jackson filling in for an injured Brian Orakpo in 2012.

With the draft lined up perfectly after trading down, Cerrato proceeded to take two talented but knuckleheaded receivers (Devin Thomas and Davis) who from day one seemed a lot more interested in enjoying the trappings being an NFL player, than actually playing football. Cerrato also took  another receiver in Malcome Kelly, who their own medical staff had warned against taking, a player who had only one good game for his career, while turning out, as predicted, to be Waterford Christal fragile.

Then in the third round Cerrato selected Chad Rinehart, a guard who sent the draftniks scrambling to figure out who this guy was he was so far down most draft boards. And as it turns out, Rinehart amounted to practically nothing in two seasons with the Redskins, though after stints on the practice squads of the Jets and the Bills, Rinehart eventually landed a starting job with the Chargers in 2013.

Other than seventh round pick Jackson, the remaining picks were so forgettable, and spent so little time with the Redskins, that all but the hardest of hardcore fans would be just as likely to identify the names Tryon, Brooks, Moore, Horton and Brennan as K Street law firm as the remnants of the draft Class of 2008.

But the real kick in the teeth, and one of the many reasons that the Redskins have been mostly awful for the past six years, are the future Pro Bowlers that were sitting there for the Redskins to take, and didn't.

Instead of one of the worst draft classes in league history, the Redskins had the woulda, coulda, shoulda opportunity to completely recast their fortunes, and whiffed.

The Redskins selected the talented but seemingly disinterested Thomas with picked #34,  with Jordy Nelson, perhaps the games best all-around receiver going to Green Bay two picks later.

Then with pick #48, they took the unreliable Davis even though they already had versatile tight end Chris Cooley on their roster.   If they were willing to take a talented headcase, they should have jumped at the chance to get  one of the NFL's all-time great deep threats in DeSean Jackson who went one pick later.

Or they could have taken defensive end Calais Campbell, a consistent force for the Arizona Cardinals defense which has been among the best in football for the past few years, who went a pick after Jackson.

Or they could have taken Jamaal Charles, the kind of game-breaking, versatile running back they have been trying to draft nearly every year since 2008, without success.

Or they could have gone for run-stuffing tackle Red Bryant, and even paired him with Campbell to immediately add half of a formidable front four, which they haven't had in years. While the Redskins had the golden opportunity to draft both,  alas, they ended up with neither.   

And instead of thinking they were smarter than everyone else by reaching to take Rinehart in the third round, the more heralded Carl Nicks, a future Pro Bowl guard was just sitting there for the taking all the way into round 5.

And wouldn't have been great if, instead of taking a punter who couldn't punt in Durrant Brooks in the 6th round, they had recognized the talent of Pierre Garcon, as the Colts did, and gotten him at a bargain price, instead of having to overpay to get him four years later.

The springboard to the Redskins Superbowl era success of the 1980's and early 1991's was set up by one Super Draft and the accompanying undrafted free agents in 1982. That year's haul included four future Pro Bowlers. In a matter of days Bobby Beatherd was able to completely reshape the offensive line by adding Mark May, Russ Grimm and Joe Jacoby, fortified the defensive lien with run stopper and a pass rusher with Darryl Grant and Dexter Manley, plus considerably bolstering the the speed of their receiving corp with tight end Clint Didier and wide receiver Charlie Brown.

With another chance to significantly upgrade their roster in 2008, Cerrato and company completely whiffed, and the Redskins are still suffering from the fallout six years later.
 

 

20 Years of Redskins Futility in One Quote

One comment from Redskins Head Coach Jay Gruden sums up perfectly why the Redskins have been a losing team for most of the past two decades. This week, Gruden assessed the Redskins season so far by saying, "a play here, a play there, we're just so close to being 7-2 instead of 3-6."

If only someone at Redskins park has the smarts or job security to tell you flat out: "NO WAY!"

And as long as this "cup half full" attitude permeates this organization, as it has since Dan Snyder took over the team nearly 20 years ago, this team will never win.

In order to be good one day, the Redskins "powers that be" (whomever they may be) have to first admit that they aren't a very good football team right now, and then spend the next 3-4 years building a winner, piece by piece. It is borderline delusional to This team continue acting as if they are just one play, one call, one bounce or one star player away from being among NFL elite.

Because while Gruden is dreaming of winning four more woulda, coulda, shoulda games, no one is addressing the team's fundamental personnel weaknesses which leave this team a half a dozen or more good players away from being truly competitive.

After all, what playoff caliber team starts four offensive lineman who are either league average or below average at their position.

What Superbowl contender starts two safeties that are too slow to keep up with any good wide receivers down the field, and not agile enough to tackle in open spaces.

No good team starts two young cornerbacks that are fairly good at man-to-man coverage, but at the same time are absolutely horrible at playing any kind of zone (backed by a nickel back that simply can't cover no matter what the defense).  

And what 7-2 team generates virtually no pass rush without blitzing linebackers, or safeties, or both.

It has been often said, "you are what your record says you are." And with all of these weaknesses, it is foolish to say the Redskins are anything better than their 3-6 record.

Now, I'm not knocking Coach Gruden's optimism, (or that of Coaches Shanahan, Zorn, Gibbs, or Spurrier before him). A head couch should believe that his team has at least a chance to win every game.

But you can't have an entire organization thinking like that. Or, worse yet, one that hurls the "hater" label at anyone who objectively assesses the weaknesses and needs of this team.

Let Snyder, GM Bruce Allen, and Gruden keep up the "Happy Talk" that constantly emanates from Redskins Park. But to counterbalance this and move forward to better times, the team must hire a grounded voice of reason, to tell it to them straight -- replacing this "culture of unfounded optimism" with an uncomfortable dose of reality.

This person can't be angling to be the next coach or next GM, and shouldn't care less about being the owner's buddy -- happily joining Snyder for aged steaks and over-priced wine. This person must be arrogant enough not to want or need to be liked, but with the experience and clout so their sage advice isn't ignored.

This needs to be a guy who won't quietly accept the owner's wish to trade four high draft picks for one talented but fragile quarterback. This guy knows better than to hope and wish the offensive line improves year and year without using high draft picks on lineman high (rounds one or two). This is a guy who won't dream of spending $100 million on one fat, unmotivated defensive lineman thinking the pass rush problem is solved with the stroke of a pen.

So until Dan Snyder and Bruce Allen admit they aren't the "smartest guys in the room," stop thinking that they are way closer to being good than they really are, and hire a successful team builder like Bill Parcells or Bill Polian to set them on the right course, the losing will continue, year after optimistic year. 

       

      

    

Simple Solution to the Redskins Third Down Woes

One of the primary reasons the Washington Redskins will be sporting a record of 2 wins and 6 losses through the first have of the season (assuming no big upset in Dallas on Monday night), is their lack of play-making on both sides of the ball on third down.

There is little that the Redskins can do mid-season to address their two main personal deficiencies -- their offensive line and their defensive backfield, but their is one simple strategic change they can make that is their best chance of solving this third down problem for the remainder of this this season. Start going for it on fourth down.

At first blush this may seem like a flip and impractical solution, but most non-conventional ideas are initially viewed that way.  But once this simple concept morphs into a new mindset, it completely changes the dynamics that clearly aren't working for this losing team.

For example, with conventional thinking, an Alfred Morris stretch-play run off left tackle for three yards on first down, doesn't accomplishes very much toward the Redskins maintaining control of the ball and the clock. But with a four down mindset, that same three yard gain has now set the team up for the equivalent of a conventional first and seven, with three plays to get seven yards to maintain possession.

And with one of Washington's most dangerous weapons being the high-risk, high-reward first down play action deep throw to speedy wideout Deshawn Jackson, when this play ends up in an incompletion, which it inevitably will more than 50% of the time, the Redskins will be then starting with a conventional first and ten even after a first down miss. If they can hit on even two of these long passes per game, it could make a big difference on the scoreboard, as well as in backing up the defense to allow more room to run the ball and control the clock.

And while there is no real defensive solution to Washington's porous secondary, controlling the ball and the clock on offense may be the best defense that they have right now.  

Now I'm not suggesting that the Redskins go completely reckless or dogmatic with this new four down approach to the point of releasing their punter. If a drive stalls deep inside their own territory, then they should certainly punt. Or if a penalty pushes them back so they end up with 4th and long, then do the prudent thing and make the other team play to a longer field.

But every time the Redskins have a fresh set of downs starting past their own 30 yard line or so, their mentality should switch to a four down approach.

One factor in their late game drive to set up their game-winning field goal against Tennessee last week, was that when the Redskins got the ball back with a little over 2:00 minutes left on the clock and only one timeout remaining, there was no doubt that they would be going for it if they were faced with a fourth down situation.  

And even though they never faced a fourth down on this final drive, even knowing that this was the situation, seemed to liberate them from the stress and errors (false starts, dropped passes and errant throws) that have sabotaged their offensive efficiency through the first half of the year.

And after all, when you are 2 and 6 and all but mathematically out of playoff contention, what do you have to lose!

     

Memo to Matt Williams: Watch Bruce Bochy and Learn

When asked about his key strategic decisions after each game of the Washington Nationals 3-1 Division series loss to the San Francisco Giants,  Nats Manager Matt Williams' response was almost invariably, "that's the way we did it all year."

And while those regular season moves were good enough to propel his team to the best record in the National League, there is one vital lesson that Williams needs to learn from his Giant's counterpart, Bruce Bochy. And that lesson is simply: The playoffs are different.

There is a good reason why Bochy sports two World Series rings, and has his team playing for a third title in five years. He firmly realizes that the playoffs aren't a "by the book" exercise, where managerial moves can be made by a computer loaded with a season's worth of data.

Bochy practices the "art" of managing with great success, while Williams employed the "science" of managing in his first playoff series, and came up just short in three one-run losses.

In sticking with his regular season tactics, Williams seemingly ignored two important things that make the playoffs different: better competition and player's varying ability to perform under extreme pressure. 

The two most important decisions that Williams made during the Division series both involved deciding who should  pitch in crucial moments of games two and four. And each time the pitcher Williams selected for these high-leverage assignments, wasn't unable to get the job done.

In game two, even though starter Jordan Zimmermann was mowing down the Giants on only three hits through eight innings, Williams stated after the game that he had pre-determined that if Zimmermann got into any kind of trouble in the ninth, that he would summon closer Drew Storen.  After recording the first two outs, Zimmermann's three ball, one strike fastball to Joe Panik slid an inch or two wide of the outside corner, setting off Williams' "trouble alert."

It didn't seem to matter to Williams that Zimmermann was still throwing well, and wasn't showing any signs of being "out of gas."  He had gotten into trouble, no matter how modest, so it was time to go to Storen. Of course, Williams was still Arizona's third base coach when Storen last appeared in a playoff game,  a four run ninth inning meltdown two years ago that allowed the Cardinals to turn a pending victory celebration into what is now bordering on a curse.

This time, Storen allowed two straight hits, with the Giants scoring the tying run on Pablo Sandoval's slicing double into the left field corner,in what would end up being a 2-1 Giants victory in an series defining 18-inning marathon of a playoff game.

Then with the scored tied in the seventh inning of game four, Williams summoned rookie Aaron Barrett to take command of a two on, one out jam -- a tough situation that Barrett had handled well repeatedly during the regular season. But this time, Barrett wasn't facing the Mets on a Tuesday in August. This was the playoff-hardened Giants under extreme stress.

Barrett looked visibly nervous, and pitched that way, uncorking one wild pitch that allowed the eventual winning run to score, and another pitch just as wild that, fortunately for the Nats, lead to a runner being thrown out at the plate to end the inning.

In contrast, in the the series ending game five of the League Championship series against the Cardinals, Bochy watched his usually reliable closer Santiago Castilla struggle with his control in the top of the ninth with the score tied. Bochy acted what he was seeing in at the moment, not on tendencies or a season's worth of data. So with the bases loaded and two outs, he pulled Castilla, and his miniscule 1.70 regular season ERA,  for lefty Jeremy Affeldt, who quickly produced a weak tapper from pinch hitter Oscar Taveras, ending the threat with a nifty unassisted put out at first.

Then in the bottom of the ninth, after Cardinals pitcher Michael Wacha, had thrown six straight balls, a situation that would induce many managers to have one of his lesser hitters, lie Travis Ishikawa, take a pitch to try to eke out a walk. This being the same Travis Ishikawa who had been let go by the Pirates for his lack of plate production earlier in the season. Ishikawa supremely rewarded Bochy's instincts and confidence by lashing Wacha's next offering into the rightfield stands, sending the Giants to the World Series once again.  

The Washington Nationals have a good team, built around the best starting pitching in baseball. But by the next time they make the playoffs, which could easily be next season, Williams needs to have gone to school on the managerial moves that have lead Bruce Bochy's Giants to three World Series appearances, and fully realize that indeed, the playoffs are different.

 






 

Amateur Hour for the Nationals

Coming off consecutive two games to one series wins on the road against the playoff contending Mariners and Dodgers, and sporting a 7 game lead over their division rivals from Atlanta, talk in Washington had turned from winning the division to the possibility of winning the
World Series.

And for nearly seven inning last night, the Nats indeed were looking like world-beaters. Behind the solid starting pitching of Stephen Strasburg and some timely hitting, they held what appeared to be a comfortable 7-2 lead and were threatening for more with one out, runners on second and third, and Bryce Harper at the plate.

And even when Jason Werth was thrown out at the home by a perfect throw from leftfielder Dominic Brown after catching Harper's flyball, and Werth's less than perfect slide, missing the plate with his foot and being tagged out in the split second it took for his leg to smother the plate, the game looked very much under control.

But then, for the next hour or so,  some amateur level baseball in conjunction with some bad luck turned things around completely resulting in a 9-8 Phillies win in 11 innings.

Only time will tell whether this was just one unfortunate blown game, or the Nationals weaknesses rushing to the surface all at once exposing a team that just isn't ready for the gritty baseball needed to succeed in a pennant race and post-season play.

In the top of the eight, the Phillies would register two runs after two men were out. With runners on first and second, Chase Utley smacked a sinking line drive into left-center field. Center fielder Dennard Span had a long run but with the ball hit to his gloved side had a clear opportunity to make a sliding catch to end the inning. Certainly a tough chance, but one you see made nearly night in some ballpark across America via SportsCenter.

Though Span got to the ball in time, he ended up whiffing on the catch with the ball actually going over his glove rather than under it for waht was properly ruled a double. Grady Sizemore, who had reached base earlier on an Anthony Rendon error, scored easily on the play. Then Ryan Howard followed with a perfect, though unintentional, swinging bunt rolling the ball perfectly in the Bermuda Triangle between the pitchers mound and first and second bases.

But after Marlon Byrd's deep fly to right settle in Werth's glove, the Nationals still held a 7-4 lead.

Besides some shaky fielding, and seemingly no killer instinct, the biggest position weakness for the Nationals is in the closer role, so Nats fans could take little comfort when Raphael Soriano,  (the human heartache) with his ERA of over 6.00 since the All-Star break, took the bump for the top of the ninth along with his 6.00+ ERA since the All-Star break.    

By the time Soraino was pulled by manager Matt Williams with two outs in the ninth,  he had given up a two-run homer to Carlos Ruiz, and a two out, two strike home run to Ben Revere, only Revere's second round tripper in nearly 500 at bats this season. 

Then to complete the meltdown, the Phillies were gifted two more runs in the 11 inning, set up by  Harper running into Span on very catchable fly to leftcenter field and compounded by yet another error, this time on a throw to the plate by first basemen Ryan Moore.

So instead of leaving Nationals Park Friday evening up one more game in their division, Washington was left to ponder not only the loss of this one game, but their fundamental fielding flaws, while searching for a closer who will allow them to be competitive come October. 

Jay Gruden's No Good Very Very Very Bad Day

You can feel it coming. The painful, and possibly defining moment, of Jay Gruden's tenure as the head coach of the Washington Redskins. Though Gruden hasn't even coached his first regular season game for the Redskins, the clock is already ticking toward a major crisis. And how he handles it,  could determine whether there is a Gruden era in Washington.

After seeing his 1st team inept offense performance against the Baltimore Ravens Saturday evening, it doesn't seem like much of a stretch to imagine that around 4:00 P.M. on September 14th, Gruden and his team being escorted from FedEx Field by what's left of an angry and frustrated home crowd after losing a sloppy game to the less than stout team from Jacksonville. And if this follows an opening weekend loss in Houston, Gruden will then face a stream of media questions as a winless head coach with a major quarterback controversy on his hands.

Against the Ravens, Washington's face-of-the-franchise quarterback was awful, overseeing an offense that produce almost as many turnovers (2) as it did points (3) in a little more than a half of play. And this doesn't count RGIII's flub of simple and accurate shotgun snap that robbed his team of the chance to keep a promising drive going.

For the evening, Griffin's quarterback rating of 27.1 was a good indication of how badly he and his offense mates played. At least on this night, he and his mates looked like a team that will struggle to win a game, any game, let alone deserve to be in the playoff conversation.

Last year, Griffin was obviously struggling physically with his knee - never displaying with the speed and explosiveness that had marked his successful rookie campaign in 2012. So far this preseason, his speed seems to have returned, and he has thrown a few really crisp, accurate passes.

But he hasn't shown any ability to throw under pass-rush pressure, or to quickly diagnose defenses and respond with a quick release. And even when he has plenty of time in the pocket, it too often appears that he just doesn't see the field very well.

A prime example of this was the disaterous first play from scrimmage to open the second half against the Ravens. The offense line did a good job on this occasion, giving Griffin plenty of time to survey the field. And, even on TV, it was obvious that tight end Jordan Reed was running virtually uncovered up the left seem. Surely, with time, Griffen would spot him and make a fairly routine throw for a big gain.

Instead, after seemingly taking a glance in Reed's direction, Griffen held the ball for an extra count before dumping it off to Alfred Morris, who had swung out of the backfield while tracked by two Ravens. As the ball arrived, Morris was sandwiched, popping it up into the air for an easy interception. 

The fact that Kirk Cousins entered the game on the next series looking sharp and decisive, making quick reads and mostly accurate throws will undoubtedly put extra stress on Gruden if Griffin and the offense doesn't perform considerably better once the regular season gets underway.

And by around 4:00 on September 14th, if the Redskins are 0-2, and the offense is largely to blame, Gruden will be holding perhaps the most uncomfortable, and the most important media session of his entire life.

Gruden was brought to Washington to win with Griffin,  and it will be very interesting to see if circumstances and performance allow him to stick with that plan past the first two games of his head coaching career.