Simple Solution to the Redskins Third Down Woes

One of the primary reasons the Washington Redskins will be sporting a record of 2 wins and 6 losses through the first have of the season (assuming no big upset in Dallas on Monday night), is their lack of play-making on both sides of the ball on third down.

There is little that the Redskins can do mid-season to address their two main personal deficiencies -- their offensive line and their defensive backfield, but their is one simple strategic change they can make that is their best chance of solving this third down problem for the remainder of this this season. Start going for it on fourth down.

At first blush this may seem like a flip and impractical solution, but most non-conventional ideas are initially viewed that way.  But once this simple concept morphs into a new mindset, it completely changes the dynamics that clearly aren't working for this losing team.

For example, with conventional thinking, an Alfred Morris stretch-play run off left tackle for three yards on first down, doesn't accomplishes very much toward the Redskins maintaining control of the ball and the clock. But with a four down mindset, that same three yard gain has now set the team up for the equivalent of a conventional first and seven, with three plays to get seven yards to maintain possession.

And with one of Washington's most dangerous weapons being the high-risk, high-reward first down play action deep throw to speedy wideout Deshawn Jackson, when this play ends up in an incompletion, which it inevitably will more than 50% of the time, the Redskins will be then starting with a conventional first and ten even after a first down miss. If they can hit on even two of these long passes per game, it could make a big difference on the scoreboard, as well as in backing up the defense to allow more room to run the ball and control the clock.

And while there is no real defensive solution to Washington's porous secondary, controlling the ball and the clock on offense may be the best defense that they have right now.  

Now I'm not suggesting that the Redskins go completely reckless or dogmatic with this new four down approach to the point of releasing their punter. If a drive stalls deep inside their own territory, then they should certainly punt. Or if a penalty pushes them back so they end up with 4th and long, then do the prudent thing and make the other team play to a longer field.

But every time the Redskins have a fresh set of downs starting past their own 30 yard line or so, their mentality should switch to a four down approach.

One factor in their late game drive to set up their game-winning field goal against Tennessee last week, was that when the Redskins got the ball back with a little over 2:00 minutes left on the clock and only one timeout remaining, there was no doubt that they would be going for it if they were faced with a fourth down situation.  

And even though they never faced a fourth down on this final drive, even knowing that this was the situation, seemed to liberate them from the stress and errors (false starts, dropped passes and errant throws) that have sabotaged their offensive efficiency through the first half of the year.

And after all, when you are 2 and 6 and all but mathematically out of playoff contention, what do you have to lose!

     

Memo to Matt Williams: Watch Bruce Bochy and Learn

When asked about his key strategic decisions after each game of the Washington Nationals 3-1 Division series loss to the San Francisco Giants,  Nats Manager Matt Williams' response was almost invariably, "that's the way we did it all year."

And while those regular season moves were good enough to propel his team to the best record in the National League, there is one vital lesson that Williams needs to learn from his Giant's counterpart, Bruce Bochy. And that lesson is simply: The playoffs are different.

There is a good reason why Bochy sports two World Series rings, and has his team playing for a third title in five years. He firmly realizes that the playoffs aren't a "by the book" exercise, where managerial moves can be made by a computer loaded with a season's worth of data.

Bochy practices the "art" of managing with great success, while Williams employed the "science" of managing in his first playoff series, and came up just short in three one-run losses.

In sticking with his regular season tactics, Williams seemingly ignored two important things that make the playoffs different: better competition and player's varying ability to perform under extreme pressure. 

The two most important decisions that Williams made during the Division series both involved deciding who should  pitch in crucial moments of games two and four. And each time the pitcher Williams selected for these high-leverage assignments, wasn't unable to get the job done.

In game two, even though starter Jordan Zimmermann was mowing down the Giants on only three hits through eight innings, Williams stated after the game that he had pre-determined that if Zimmermann got into any kind of trouble in the ninth, that he would summon closer Drew Storen.  After recording the first two outs, Zimmermann's three ball, one strike fastball to Joe Panik slid an inch or two wide of the outside corner, setting off Williams' "trouble alert."

It didn't seem to matter to Williams that Zimmermann was still throwing well, and wasn't showing any signs of being "out of gas."  He had gotten into trouble, no matter how modest, so it was time to go to Storen. Of course, Williams was still Arizona's third base coach when Storen last appeared in a playoff game,  a four run ninth inning meltdown two years ago that allowed the Cardinals to turn a pending victory celebration into what is now bordering on a curse.

This time, Storen allowed two straight hits, with the Giants scoring the tying run on Pablo Sandoval's slicing double into the left field corner,in what would end up being a 2-1 Giants victory in an series defining 18-inning marathon of a playoff game.

Then with the scored tied in the seventh inning of game four, Williams summoned rookie Aaron Barrett to take command of a two on, one out jam -- a tough situation that Barrett had handled well repeatedly during the regular season. But this time, Barrett wasn't facing the Mets on a Tuesday in August. This was the playoff-hardened Giants under extreme stress.

Barrett looked visibly nervous, and pitched that way, uncorking one wild pitch that allowed the eventual winning run to score, and another pitch just as wild that, fortunately for the Nats, lead to a runner being thrown out at the plate to end the inning.

In contrast, in the the series ending game five of the League Championship series against the Cardinals, Bochy watched his usually reliable closer Santiago Castilla struggle with his control in the top of the ninth with the score tied. Bochy acted what he was seeing in at the moment, not on tendencies or a season's worth of data. So with the bases loaded and two outs, he pulled Castilla, and his miniscule 1.70 regular season ERA,  for lefty Jeremy Affeldt, who quickly produced a weak tapper from pinch hitter Oscar Taveras, ending the threat with a nifty unassisted put out at first.

Then in the bottom of the ninth, after Cardinals pitcher Michael Wacha, had thrown six straight balls, a situation that would induce many managers to have one of his lesser hitters, lie Travis Ishikawa, take a pitch to try to eke out a walk. This being the same Travis Ishikawa who had been let go by the Pirates for his lack of plate production earlier in the season. Ishikawa supremely rewarded Bochy's instincts and confidence by lashing Wacha's next offering into the rightfield stands, sending the Giants to the World Series once again.  

The Washington Nationals have a good team, built around the best starting pitching in baseball. But by the next time they make the playoffs, which could easily be next season, Williams needs to have gone to school on the managerial moves that have lead Bruce Bochy's Giants to three World Series appearances, and fully realize that indeed, the playoffs are different.