It has been six years since the 2008 draft, the years those drafted players should have had a significant impact on the fortunes of the Redskins. But instead of providing a large group of "core Redskins" in their prime years, the 2008 draft class produced almost nothing.
The 2008 draft was billed as one with little top-flight talent but one loaded with depth, with a bunch of good players ready to be taken throughout the first few rounds.
The lack of top-end talent was borne out by the first three picks -- offensive tackle Jake Long, defensive end Chris Long, and quarterback Matt Ryan, all nice players, though none of which have had a anything close to a transformational impact on their teams.
Things seemed to get off to a good start for the Redskins when General Manager Vinny Cerrato was able to trade a package of picks including #21 in the first round for two additional second rounders. As it turns out, the second round was loaded with future Pro Bowlers, and the Redskins were now sitting with three second-round selections.
The Redskins entered the draft looking to upgrade their receivers, their offensive and defensive lines, and their secondary. Three of the four positions where the Redskins are still have average to below average talent on their roster six years later.
In 2014, from a 2008 draft class of 10, the Redskins have grand total of ZERO players remaining on their roster. And in the intervening years, the major contributions from this entire class consisted of one good year from tight end Fred Davis, and one solid stretch at linebacker from Rob Jackson filling in for an injured Brian Orakpo in 2012.
With the draft lined up perfectly after trading down, Cerrato proceeded to take two talented but knuckleheaded receivers (Devin Thomas and Davis) who from day one seemed a lot more interested in enjoying the trappings being an NFL player, than actually playing football. Cerrato also took another receiver in Malcome Kelly, who their own medical staff had warned against taking, a player who had only one good game for his career, while turning out, as predicted, to be Waterford Christal fragile.
Then in the third round Cerrato selected Chad Rinehart, a guard who sent the draftniks scrambling to figure out who this guy was he was so far down most draft boards. And as it turns out, Rinehart amounted to practically nothing in two seasons with the Redskins, though after stints on the practice squads of the Jets and the Bills, Rinehart eventually landed a starting job with the Chargers in 2013.
Other than seventh round pick Jackson, the remaining picks were so forgettable, and spent so little time with the Redskins, that all but the hardest of hardcore fans would be just as likely to identify the names Tryon, Brooks, Moore, Horton and Brennan as K Street law firm as the remnants of the draft Class of 2008.
But the real kick in the teeth, and one of the many reasons that the Redskins have been mostly awful for the past six years, are the future Pro Bowlers that were sitting there for the Redskins to take, and didn't.
Instead of one of the worst draft classes in league history, the Redskins had the woulda, coulda, shoulda opportunity to completely recast their fortunes, and whiffed.
The Redskins selected the talented but seemingly disinterested Thomas with picked #34, with Jordy Nelson, perhaps the games best all-around receiver going to Green Bay two picks later.
Then with pick #48, they took the unreliable Davis even though they already had versatile tight end Chris Cooley on their roster. If they were willing to take a talented headcase, they should have jumped at the chance to get one of the NFL's all-time great deep threats in DeSean Jackson who went one pick later.
Or they could have taken defensive end Calais Campbell, a consistent force for the Arizona Cardinals defense which has been among the best in football for the past few years, who went a pick after Jackson.
Or they could have taken Jamaal Charles, the kind of game-breaking, versatile running back they have been trying to draft nearly every year since 2008, without success.
Or they could have gone for run-stuffing tackle Red Bryant, and even paired him with Campbell to immediately add half of a formidable front four, which they haven't had in years. While the Redskins had the golden opportunity to draft both, alas, they ended up with neither.
And instead of thinking they were smarter than everyone else by reaching to take Rinehart in the third round, the more heralded Carl Nicks, a future Pro Bowl guard was just sitting there for the taking all the way into round 5.
And wouldn't have been great if, instead of taking a punter who couldn't punt in Durrant Brooks in the 6th round, they had recognized the talent of Pierre Garcon, as the Colts did, and gotten him at a bargain price, instead of having to overpay to get him four years later.
The springboard to the Redskins Superbowl era success of the 1980's and early 1991's was set up by one Super Draft and the accompanying undrafted free agents in 1982. That year's haul included four future Pro Bowlers. In a matter of days Bobby Beatherd was able to completely reshape the offensive line by adding Mark May, Russ Grimm and Joe Jacoby, fortified the defensive lien with run stopper and a pass rusher with Darryl Grant and Dexter Manley, plus considerably bolstering the the speed of their receiving corp with tight end Clint Didier and wide receiver Charlie Brown.
With another chance to significantly upgrade their roster in 2008, Cerrato and company completely whiffed, and the Redskins are still suffering from the fallout six years later.
Monday, December 29, 2014
Wednesday, November 12, 2014
20 Years of Redskins Futility in One Quote
One comment from Redskins Head Coach Jay Gruden sums up perfectly why the Redskins have been a losing team for most of the past two decades. This week, Gruden assessed the Redskins season so far by saying, "a play here, a play there, we're just so close to being 7-2 instead of 3-6."
If only someone at Redskins park has the smarts or job security to tell you flat out: "NO WAY!"
And as long as this "cup half full" attitude permeates this organization, as it has since Dan Snyder took over the team nearly 20 years ago, this team will never win.
In order to be good one day, the Redskins "powers that be" (whomever they may be) have to first admit that they aren't a very good football team right now, and then spend the next 3-4 years building a winner, piece by piece. It is borderline delusional to This team continue acting as if they are just one play, one call, one bounce or one star player away from being among NFL elite.
Because while Gruden is dreaming of winning four more woulda, coulda, shoulda games, no one is addressing the team's fundamental personnel weaknesses which leave this team a half a dozen or more good players away from being truly competitive.
After all, what playoff caliber team starts four offensive lineman who are either league average or below average at their position.
What Superbowl contender starts two safeties that are too slow to keep up with any good wide receivers down the field, and not agile enough to tackle in open spaces.
No good team starts two young cornerbacks that are fairly good at man-to-man coverage, but at the same time are absolutely horrible at playing any kind of zone (backed by a nickel back that simply can't cover no matter what the defense).
And what 7-2 team generates virtually no pass rush without blitzing linebackers, or safeties, or both.
It has been often said, "you are what your record says you are." And with all of these weaknesses, it is foolish to say the Redskins are anything better than their 3-6 record.
Now, I'm not knocking Coach Gruden's optimism, (or that of Coaches Shanahan, Zorn, Gibbs, or Spurrier before him). A head couch should believe that his team has at least a chance to win every game.
But you can't have an entire organization thinking like that. Or, worse yet, one that hurls the "hater" label at anyone who objectively assesses the weaknesses and needs of this team.
Let Snyder, GM Bruce Allen, and Gruden keep up the "Happy Talk" that constantly emanates from Redskins Park. But to counterbalance this and move forward to better times, the team must hire a grounded voice of reason, to tell it to them straight -- replacing this "culture of unfounded optimism" with an uncomfortable dose of reality.
This person can't be angling to be the next coach or next GM, and shouldn't care less about being the owner's buddy -- happily joining Snyder for aged steaks and over-priced wine. This person must be arrogant enough not to want or need to be liked, but with the experience and clout so their sage advice isn't ignored.
This needs to be a guy who won't quietly accept the owner's wish to trade four high draft picks for one talented but fragile quarterback. This guy knows better than to hope and wish the offensive line improves year and year without using high draft picks on lineman high (rounds one or two). This is a guy who won't dream of spending $100 million on one fat, unmotivated defensive lineman thinking the pass rush problem is solved with the stroke of a pen.
So until Dan Snyder and Bruce Allen admit they aren't the "smartest guys in the room," stop thinking that they are way closer to being good than they really are, and hire a successful team builder like Bill Parcells or Bill Polian to set them on the right course, the losing will continue, year after optimistic year.
If only someone at Redskins park has the smarts or job security to tell you flat out: "NO WAY!"
And as long as this "cup half full" attitude permeates this organization, as it has since Dan Snyder took over the team nearly 20 years ago, this team will never win.
In order to be good one day, the Redskins "powers that be" (whomever they may be) have to first admit that they aren't a very good football team right now, and then spend the next 3-4 years building a winner, piece by piece. It is borderline delusional to This team continue acting as if they are just one play, one call, one bounce or one star player away from being among NFL elite.
Because while Gruden is dreaming of winning four more woulda, coulda, shoulda games, no one is addressing the team's fundamental personnel weaknesses which leave this team a half a dozen or more good players away from being truly competitive.
After all, what playoff caliber team starts four offensive lineman who are either league average or below average at their position.
What Superbowl contender starts two safeties that are too slow to keep up with any good wide receivers down the field, and not agile enough to tackle in open spaces.
No good team starts two young cornerbacks that are fairly good at man-to-man coverage, but at the same time are absolutely horrible at playing any kind of zone (backed by a nickel back that simply can't cover no matter what the defense).
And what 7-2 team generates virtually no pass rush without blitzing linebackers, or safeties, or both.
It has been often said, "you are what your record says you are." And with all of these weaknesses, it is foolish to say the Redskins are anything better than their 3-6 record.
Now, I'm not knocking Coach Gruden's optimism, (or that of Coaches Shanahan, Zorn, Gibbs, or Spurrier before him). A head couch should believe that his team has at least a chance to win every game.
But you can't have an entire organization thinking like that. Or, worse yet, one that hurls the "hater" label at anyone who objectively assesses the weaknesses and needs of this team.
Let Snyder, GM Bruce Allen, and Gruden keep up the "Happy Talk" that constantly emanates from Redskins Park. But to counterbalance this and move forward to better times, the team must hire a grounded voice of reason, to tell it to them straight -- replacing this "culture of unfounded optimism" with an uncomfortable dose of reality.
This person can't be angling to be the next coach or next GM, and shouldn't care less about being the owner's buddy -- happily joining Snyder for aged steaks and over-priced wine. This person must be arrogant enough not to want or need to be liked, but with the experience and clout so their sage advice isn't ignored.
This needs to be a guy who won't quietly accept the owner's wish to trade four high draft picks for one talented but fragile quarterback. This guy knows better than to hope and wish the offensive line improves year and year without using high draft picks on lineman high (rounds one or two). This is a guy who won't dream of spending $100 million on one fat, unmotivated defensive lineman thinking the pass rush problem is solved with the stroke of a pen.
So until Dan Snyder and Bruce Allen admit they aren't the "smartest guys in the room," stop thinking that they are way closer to being good than they really are, and hire a successful team builder like Bill Parcells or Bill Polian to set them on the right course, the losing will continue, year after optimistic year.
Saturday, October 25, 2014
Simple Solution to the Redskins Third Down Woes
One of the primary reasons the Washington Redskins will be sporting a record of 2 wins and 6 losses through the first have of the season (assuming no big upset in Dallas on Monday night), is their lack of play-making on both sides of the ball on third down.
There is little that the Redskins can do mid-season to address their two main personal deficiencies -- their offensive line and their defensive backfield, but their is one simple strategic change they can make that is their best chance of solving this third down problem for the remainder of this this season. Start going for it on fourth down.
At first blush this may seem like a flip and impractical solution, but most non-conventional ideas are initially viewed that way. But once this simple concept morphs into a new mindset, it completely changes the dynamics that clearly aren't working for this losing team.
For example, with conventional thinking, an Alfred Morris stretch-play run off left tackle for three yards on first down, doesn't accomplishes very much toward the Redskins maintaining control of the ball and the clock. But with a four down mindset, that same three yard gain has now set the team up for the equivalent of a conventional first and seven, with three plays to get seven yards to maintain possession.
And with one of Washington's most dangerous weapons being the high-risk, high-reward first down play action deep throw to speedy wideout Deshawn Jackson, when this play ends up in an incompletion, which it inevitably will more than 50% of the time, the Redskins will be then starting with a conventional first and ten even after a first down miss. If they can hit on even two of these long passes per game, it could make a big difference on the scoreboard, as well as in backing up the defense to allow more room to run the ball and control the clock.
And while there is no real defensive solution to Washington's porous secondary, controlling the ball and the clock on offense may be the best defense that they have right now.
Now I'm not suggesting that the Redskins go completely reckless or dogmatic with this new four down approach to the point of releasing their punter. If a drive stalls deep inside their own territory, then they should certainly punt. Or if a penalty pushes them back so they end up with 4th and long, then do the prudent thing and make the other team play to a longer field.
But every time the Redskins have a fresh set of downs starting past their own 30 yard line or so, their mentality should switch to a four down approach.
One factor in their late game drive to set up their game-winning field goal against Tennessee last week, was that when the Redskins got the ball back with a little over 2:00 minutes left on the clock and only one timeout remaining, there was no doubt that they would be going for it if they were faced with a fourth down situation.
And even though they never faced a fourth down on this final drive, even knowing that this was the situation, seemed to liberate them from the stress and errors (false starts, dropped passes and errant throws) that have sabotaged their offensive efficiency through the first half of the year.
And after all, when you are 2 and 6 and all but mathematically out of playoff contention, what do you have to lose!
There is little that the Redskins can do mid-season to address their two main personal deficiencies -- their offensive line and their defensive backfield, but their is one simple strategic change they can make that is their best chance of solving this third down problem for the remainder of this this season. Start going for it on fourth down.
At first blush this may seem like a flip and impractical solution, but most non-conventional ideas are initially viewed that way. But once this simple concept morphs into a new mindset, it completely changes the dynamics that clearly aren't working for this losing team.
For example, with conventional thinking, an Alfred Morris stretch-play run off left tackle for three yards on first down, doesn't accomplishes very much toward the Redskins maintaining control of the ball and the clock. But with a four down mindset, that same three yard gain has now set the team up for the equivalent of a conventional first and seven, with three plays to get seven yards to maintain possession.
And with one of Washington's most dangerous weapons being the high-risk, high-reward first down play action deep throw to speedy wideout Deshawn Jackson, when this play ends up in an incompletion, which it inevitably will more than 50% of the time, the Redskins will be then starting with a conventional first and ten even after a first down miss. If they can hit on even two of these long passes per game, it could make a big difference on the scoreboard, as well as in backing up the defense to allow more room to run the ball and control the clock.
And while there is no real defensive solution to Washington's porous secondary, controlling the ball and the clock on offense may be the best defense that they have right now.
Now I'm not suggesting that the Redskins go completely reckless or dogmatic with this new four down approach to the point of releasing their punter. If a drive stalls deep inside their own territory, then they should certainly punt. Or if a penalty pushes them back so they end up with 4th and long, then do the prudent thing and make the other team play to a longer field.
But every time the Redskins have a fresh set of downs starting past their own 30 yard line or so, their mentality should switch to a four down approach.
One factor in their late game drive to set up their game-winning field goal against Tennessee last week, was that when the Redskins got the ball back with a little over 2:00 minutes left on the clock and only one timeout remaining, there was no doubt that they would be going for it if they were faced with a fourth down situation.
And even though they never faced a fourth down on this final drive, even knowing that this was the situation, seemed to liberate them from the stress and errors (false starts, dropped passes and errant throws) that have sabotaged their offensive efficiency through the first half of the year.
And after all, when you are 2 and 6 and all but mathematically out of playoff contention, what do you have to lose!
Sunday, October 19, 2014
Memo to Matt Williams: Watch Bruce Bochy and Learn
When asked about his key strategic decisions after each game of the Washington Nationals 3-1 Division series loss to the San Francisco Giants, Nats Manager Matt Williams' response was almost invariably, "that's the way we did it all year."
And while those regular season moves were good enough to propel his team to the best record in the National League, there is one vital lesson that Williams needs to learn from his Giant's counterpart, Bruce Bochy. And that lesson is simply: The playoffs are different.
There is a good reason why Bochy sports two World Series rings, and has his team playing for a third title in five years. He firmly realizes that the playoffs aren't a "by the book" exercise, where managerial moves can be made by a computer loaded with a season's worth of data.
Bochy practices the "art" of managing with great success, while Williams employed the "science" of managing in his first playoff series, and came up just short in three one-run losses.
In sticking with his regular season tactics, Williams seemingly ignored two important things that make the playoffs different: better competition and player's varying ability to perform under extreme pressure.
The two most important decisions that Williams made during the Division series both involved deciding who should pitch in crucial moments of games two and four. And each time the pitcher Williams selected for these high-leverage assignments, wasn't unable to get the job done.
In game two, even though starter Jordan Zimmermann was mowing down the Giants on only three hits through eight innings, Williams stated after the game that he had pre-determined that if Zimmermann got into any kind of trouble in the ninth, that he would summon closer Drew Storen. After recording the first two outs, Zimmermann's three ball, one strike fastball to Joe Panik slid an inch or two wide of the outside corner, setting off Williams' "trouble alert."
It didn't seem to matter to Williams that Zimmermann was still throwing well, and wasn't showing any signs of being "out of gas." He had gotten into trouble, no matter how modest, so it was time to go to Storen. Of course, Williams was still Arizona's third base coach when Storen last appeared in a playoff game, a four run ninth inning meltdown two years ago that allowed the Cardinals to turn a pending victory celebration into what is now bordering on a curse.
This time, Storen allowed two straight hits, with the Giants scoring the tying run on Pablo Sandoval's slicing double into the left field corner,in what would end up being a 2-1 Giants victory in an series defining 18-inning marathon of a playoff game.
Then with the scored tied in the seventh inning of game four, Williams summoned rookie Aaron Barrett to take command of a two on, one out jam -- a tough situation that Barrett had handled well repeatedly during the regular season. But this time, Barrett wasn't facing the Mets on a Tuesday in August. This was the playoff-hardened Giants under extreme stress.
Barrett looked visibly nervous, and pitched that way, uncorking one wild pitch that allowed the eventual winning run to score, and another pitch just as wild that, fortunately for the Nats, lead to a runner being thrown out at the plate to end the inning.
In contrast, in the the series ending game five of the League Championship series against the Cardinals, Bochy watched his usually reliable closer Santiago Castilla struggle with his control in the top of the ninth with the score tied. Bochy acted what he was seeing in at the moment, not on tendencies or a season's worth of data. So with the bases loaded and two outs, he pulled Castilla, and his miniscule 1.70 regular season ERA, for lefty Jeremy Affeldt, who quickly produced a weak tapper from pinch hitter Oscar Taveras, ending the threat with a nifty unassisted put out at first.
Then in the bottom of the ninth, after Cardinals pitcher Michael Wacha, had thrown six straight balls, a situation that would induce many managers to have one of his lesser hitters, lie Travis Ishikawa, take a pitch to try to eke out a walk. This being the same Travis Ishikawa who had been let go by the Pirates for his lack of plate production earlier in the season. Ishikawa supremely rewarded Bochy's instincts and confidence by lashing Wacha's next offering into the rightfield stands, sending the Giants to the World Series once again.
The Washington Nationals have a good team, built around the best starting pitching in baseball. But by the next time they make the playoffs, which could easily be next season, Williams needs to have gone to school on the managerial moves that have lead Bruce Bochy's Giants to three World Series appearances, and fully realize that indeed, the playoffs are different.
And while those regular season moves were good enough to propel his team to the best record in the National League, there is one vital lesson that Williams needs to learn from his Giant's counterpart, Bruce Bochy. And that lesson is simply: The playoffs are different.
There is a good reason why Bochy sports two World Series rings, and has his team playing for a third title in five years. He firmly realizes that the playoffs aren't a "by the book" exercise, where managerial moves can be made by a computer loaded with a season's worth of data.
Bochy practices the "art" of managing with great success, while Williams employed the "science" of managing in his first playoff series, and came up just short in three one-run losses.
In sticking with his regular season tactics, Williams seemingly ignored two important things that make the playoffs different: better competition and player's varying ability to perform under extreme pressure.
The two most important decisions that Williams made during the Division series both involved deciding who should pitch in crucial moments of games two and four. And each time the pitcher Williams selected for these high-leverage assignments, wasn't unable to get the job done.
In game two, even though starter Jordan Zimmermann was mowing down the Giants on only three hits through eight innings, Williams stated after the game that he had pre-determined that if Zimmermann got into any kind of trouble in the ninth, that he would summon closer Drew Storen. After recording the first two outs, Zimmermann's three ball, one strike fastball to Joe Panik slid an inch or two wide of the outside corner, setting off Williams' "trouble alert."
It didn't seem to matter to Williams that Zimmermann was still throwing well, and wasn't showing any signs of being "out of gas." He had gotten into trouble, no matter how modest, so it was time to go to Storen. Of course, Williams was still Arizona's third base coach when Storen last appeared in a playoff game, a four run ninth inning meltdown two years ago that allowed the Cardinals to turn a pending victory celebration into what is now bordering on a curse.
This time, Storen allowed two straight hits, with the Giants scoring the tying run on Pablo Sandoval's slicing double into the left field corner,in what would end up being a 2-1 Giants victory in an series defining 18-inning marathon of a playoff game.
Then with the scored tied in the seventh inning of game four, Williams summoned rookie Aaron Barrett to take command of a two on, one out jam -- a tough situation that Barrett had handled well repeatedly during the regular season. But this time, Barrett wasn't facing the Mets on a Tuesday in August. This was the playoff-hardened Giants under extreme stress.
Barrett looked visibly nervous, and pitched that way, uncorking one wild pitch that allowed the eventual winning run to score, and another pitch just as wild that, fortunately for the Nats, lead to a runner being thrown out at the plate to end the inning.
In contrast, in the the series ending game five of the League Championship series against the Cardinals, Bochy watched his usually reliable closer Santiago Castilla struggle with his control in the top of the ninth with the score tied. Bochy acted what he was seeing in at the moment, not on tendencies or a season's worth of data. So with the bases loaded and two outs, he pulled Castilla, and his miniscule 1.70 regular season ERA, for lefty Jeremy Affeldt, who quickly produced a weak tapper from pinch hitter Oscar Taveras, ending the threat with a nifty unassisted put out at first.
Then in the bottom of the ninth, after Cardinals pitcher Michael Wacha, had thrown six straight balls, a situation that would induce many managers to have one of his lesser hitters, lie Travis Ishikawa, take a pitch to try to eke out a walk. This being the same Travis Ishikawa who had been let go by the Pirates for his lack of plate production earlier in the season. Ishikawa supremely rewarded Bochy's instincts and confidence by lashing Wacha's next offering into the rightfield stands, sending the Giants to the World Series once again.
The Washington Nationals have a good team, built around the best starting pitching in baseball. But by the next time they make the playoffs, which could easily be next season, Williams needs to have gone to school on the managerial moves that have lead Bruce Bochy's Giants to three World Series appearances, and fully realize that indeed, the playoffs are different.
Saturday, September 6, 2014
Amateur Hour for the Nationals
Coming off consecutive two games to one series wins on the road against the playoff contending Mariners and Dodgers, and sporting a 7 game lead over their division rivals from Atlanta, talk in Washington had turned from winning the division to the possibility of winning the
World Series.
And for nearly seven inning last night, the Nats indeed were looking like world-beaters. Behind the solid starting pitching of Stephen Strasburg and some timely hitting, they held what appeared to be a comfortable 7-2 lead and were threatening for more with one out, runners on second and third, and Bryce Harper at the plate.
And even when Jason Werth was thrown out at the home by a perfect throw from leftfielder Dominic Brown after catching Harper's flyball, and Werth's less than perfect slide, missing the plate with his foot and being tagged out in the split second it took for his leg to smother the plate, the game looked very much under control.
But then, for the next hour or so, some amateur level baseball in conjunction with some bad luck turned things around completely resulting in a 9-8 Phillies win in 11 innings.
Only time will tell whether this was just one unfortunate blown game, or the Nationals weaknesses rushing to the surface all at once exposing a team that just isn't ready for the gritty baseball needed to succeed in a pennant race and post-season play.
In the top of the eight, the Phillies would register two runs after two men were out. With runners on first and second, Chase Utley smacked a sinking line drive into left-center field. Center fielder Dennard Span had a long run but with the ball hit to his gloved side had a clear opportunity to make a sliding catch to end the inning. Certainly a tough chance, but one you see made nearly night in some ballpark across America via SportsCenter.
Though Span got to the ball in time, he ended up whiffing on the catch with the ball actually going over his glove rather than under it for waht was properly ruled a double. Grady Sizemore, who had reached base earlier on an Anthony Rendon error, scored easily on the play. Then Ryan Howard followed with a perfect, though unintentional, swinging bunt rolling the ball perfectly in the Bermuda Triangle between the pitchers mound and first and second bases.
But after Marlon Byrd's deep fly to right settle in Werth's glove, the Nationals still held a 7-4 lead.
Besides some shaky fielding, and seemingly no killer instinct, the biggest position weakness for the Nationals is in the closer role, so Nats fans could take little comfort when Raphael Soriano, (the human heartache) with his ERA of over 6.00 since the All-Star break, took the bump for the top of the ninth along with his 6.00+ ERA since the All-Star break.
By the time Soraino was pulled by manager Matt Williams with two outs in the ninth, he had given up a two-run homer to Carlos Ruiz, and a two out, two strike home run to Ben Revere, only Revere's second round tripper in nearly 500 at bats this season.
Then to complete the meltdown, the Phillies were gifted two more runs in the 11 inning, set up by Harper running into Span on very catchable fly to leftcenter field and compounded by yet another error, this time on a throw to the plate by first basemen Ryan Moore.
So instead of leaving Nationals Park Friday evening up one more game in their division, Washington was left to ponder not only the loss of this one game, but their fundamental fielding flaws, while searching for a closer who will allow them to be competitive come October.
World Series.
And for nearly seven inning last night, the Nats indeed were looking like world-beaters. Behind the solid starting pitching of Stephen Strasburg and some timely hitting, they held what appeared to be a comfortable 7-2 lead and were threatening for more with one out, runners on second and third, and Bryce Harper at the plate.
And even when Jason Werth was thrown out at the home by a perfect throw from leftfielder Dominic Brown after catching Harper's flyball, and Werth's less than perfect slide, missing the plate with his foot and being tagged out in the split second it took for his leg to smother the plate, the game looked very much under control.
But then, for the next hour or so, some amateur level baseball in conjunction with some bad luck turned things around completely resulting in a 9-8 Phillies win in 11 innings.
Only time will tell whether this was just one unfortunate blown game, or the Nationals weaknesses rushing to the surface all at once exposing a team that just isn't ready for the gritty baseball needed to succeed in a pennant race and post-season play.
In the top of the eight, the Phillies would register two runs after two men were out. With runners on first and second, Chase Utley smacked a sinking line drive into left-center field. Center fielder Dennard Span had a long run but with the ball hit to his gloved side had a clear opportunity to make a sliding catch to end the inning. Certainly a tough chance, but one you see made nearly night in some ballpark across America via SportsCenter.
Though Span got to the ball in time, he ended up whiffing on the catch with the ball actually going over his glove rather than under it for waht was properly ruled a double. Grady Sizemore, who had reached base earlier on an Anthony Rendon error, scored easily on the play. Then Ryan Howard followed with a perfect, though unintentional, swinging bunt rolling the ball perfectly in the Bermuda Triangle between the pitchers mound and first and second bases.
But after Marlon Byrd's deep fly to right settle in Werth's glove, the Nationals still held a 7-4 lead.
Besides some shaky fielding, and seemingly no killer instinct, the biggest position weakness for the Nationals is in the closer role, so Nats fans could take little comfort when Raphael Soriano, (the human heartache) with his ERA of over 6.00 since the All-Star break, took the bump for the top of the ninth along with his 6.00+ ERA since the All-Star break.
By the time Soraino was pulled by manager Matt Williams with two outs in the ninth, he had given up a two-run homer to Carlos Ruiz, and a two out, two strike home run to Ben Revere, only Revere's second round tripper in nearly 500 at bats this season.
Then to complete the meltdown, the Phillies were gifted two more runs in the 11 inning, set up by Harper running into Span on very catchable fly to leftcenter field and compounded by yet another error, this time on a throw to the plate by first basemen Ryan Moore.
So instead of leaving Nationals Park Friday evening up one more game in their division, Washington was left to ponder not only the loss of this one game, but their fundamental fielding flaws, while searching for a closer who will allow them to be competitive come October.
Monday, August 25, 2014
Jay Gruden's No Good Very Very Very Bad Day
You can feel it coming. The painful, and possibly defining moment, of Jay Gruden's tenure as the head coach of the Washington Redskins. Though Gruden hasn't even coached his first regular season game for the Redskins, the clock is already ticking toward a major crisis. And how he handles it, could determine whether there is a Gruden era in Washington.
After seeing his 1st team inept offense performance against the Baltimore Ravens Saturday evening, it doesn't seem like much of a stretch to imagine that around 4:00 P.M. on September 14th, Gruden and his team being escorted from FedEx Field by what's left of an angry and frustrated home crowd after losing a sloppy game to the less than stout team from Jacksonville. And if this follows an opening weekend loss in Houston, Gruden will then face a stream of media questions as a winless head coach with a major quarterback controversy on his hands.
Against the Ravens, Washington's face-of-the-franchise quarterback was awful, overseeing an offense that produce almost as many turnovers (2) as it did points (3) in a little more than a half of play. And this doesn't count RGIII's flub of simple and accurate shotgun snap that robbed his team of the chance to keep a promising drive going.
For the evening, Griffin's quarterback rating of 27.1 was a good indication of how badly he and his offense mates played. At least on this night, he and his mates looked like a team that will struggle to win a game, any game, let alone deserve to be in the playoff conversation.
Last year, Griffin was obviously struggling physically with his knee - never displaying with the speed and explosiveness that had marked his successful rookie campaign in 2012. So far this preseason, his speed seems to have returned, and he has thrown a few really crisp, accurate passes.
But he hasn't shown any ability to throw under pass-rush pressure, or to quickly diagnose defenses and respond with a quick release. And even when he has plenty of time in the pocket, it too often appears that he just doesn't see the field very well.
A prime example of this was the disaterous first play from scrimmage to open the second half against the Ravens. The offense line did a good job on this occasion, giving Griffin plenty of time to survey the field. And, even on TV, it was obvious that tight end Jordan Reed was running virtually uncovered up the left seem. Surely, with time, Griffen would spot him and make a fairly routine throw for a big gain.
Instead, after seemingly taking a glance in Reed's direction, Griffen held the ball for an extra count before dumping it off to Alfred Morris, who had swung out of the backfield while tracked by two Ravens. As the ball arrived, Morris was sandwiched, popping it up into the air for an easy interception.
The fact that Kirk Cousins entered the game on the next series looking sharp and decisive, making quick reads and mostly accurate throws will undoubtedly put extra stress on Gruden if Griffin and the offense doesn't perform considerably better once the regular season gets underway.
And by around 4:00 on September 14th, if the Redskins are 0-2, and the offense is largely to blame, Gruden will be holding perhaps the most uncomfortable, and the most important media session of his entire life.
Gruden was brought to Washington to win with Griffin, and it will be very interesting to see if circumstances and performance allow him to stick with that plan past the first two games of his head coaching career.
After seeing his 1st team inept offense performance against the Baltimore Ravens Saturday evening, it doesn't seem like much of a stretch to imagine that around 4:00 P.M. on September 14th, Gruden and his team being escorted from FedEx Field by what's left of an angry and frustrated home crowd after losing a sloppy game to the less than stout team from Jacksonville. And if this follows an opening weekend loss in Houston, Gruden will then face a stream of media questions as a winless head coach with a major quarterback controversy on his hands.
Against the Ravens, Washington's face-of-the-franchise quarterback was awful, overseeing an offense that produce almost as many turnovers (2) as it did points (3) in a little more than a half of play. And this doesn't count RGIII's flub of simple and accurate shotgun snap that robbed his team of the chance to keep a promising drive going.
For the evening, Griffin's quarterback rating of 27.1 was a good indication of how badly he and his offense mates played. At least on this night, he and his mates looked like a team that will struggle to win a game, any game, let alone deserve to be in the playoff conversation.
Last year, Griffin was obviously struggling physically with his knee - never displaying with the speed and explosiveness that had marked his successful rookie campaign in 2012. So far this preseason, his speed seems to have returned, and he has thrown a few really crisp, accurate passes.
But he hasn't shown any ability to throw under pass-rush pressure, or to quickly diagnose defenses and respond with a quick release. And even when he has plenty of time in the pocket, it too often appears that he just doesn't see the field very well.
A prime example of this was the disaterous first play from scrimmage to open the second half against the Ravens. The offense line did a good job on this occasion, giving Griffin plenty of time to survey the field. And, even on TV, it was obvious that tight end Jordan Reed was running virtually uncovered up the left seem. Surely, with time, Griffen would spot him and make a fairly routine throw for a big gain.
Instead, after seemingly taking a glance in Reed's direction, Griffen held the ball for an extra count before dumping it off to Alfred Morris, who had swung out of the backfield while tracked by two Ravens. As the ball arrived, Morris was sandwiched, popping it up into the air for an easy interception.
The fact that Kirk Cousins entered the game on the next series looking sharp and decisive, making quick reads and mostly accurate throws will undoubtedly put extra stress on Gruden if Griffin and the offense doesn't perform considerably better once the regular season gets underway.
And by around 4:00 on September 14th, if the Redskins are 0-2, and the offense is largely to blame, Gruden will be holding perhaps the most uncomfortable, and the most important media session of his entire life.
Gruden was brought to Washington to win with Griffin, and it will be very interesting to see if circumstances and performance allow him to stick with that plan past the first two games of his head coaching career.
Sunday, August 10, 2014
Proving a Negative with Brady and Belichick
They say you can't prove a negative, but Washington's 23-7 preseason win over New England on Thursday night may be as close as you can come. With Tom Brady most certainly sitting out the entire game, and Coach Bill Belichick apparently sitting this one out as well as he stood mostly stone-faced on the sideline, the Redskins dominated the game from start to finish.
Without Brady's quick release and surgical precision from the pocket, and Belichick's innovative defensive schemes that so often limit the attack options of the opposition, a SuperBowl contender like the Patriots didn't evening look ordinary in this preseason affair -- they looked completely over-matched.
Washington dominated the line of scrimmage on both sides of the ball, piling up nearly 200 yards rushing. Unlike what would unfold in a regular season match-up, the Patriots played the Redskins powerful rushing attach straight up, without any Belichick-inspired wrinkles or blitzes to disrupt their rhythm. The result was being the Redskins moved the ball steadily, accumulating 26 first downs to only 15 for the Patriots, while punting only once over the course of the game.
Instead of employing any strategic changes to bolster his team, Belichick seemed content to watch basic one-on-one match ups play out, even as his second and third units weren't showing much of an ability to win these "games within the game."
And while it is certainly true that several key starters on offense, including Brady sat out the entire game, the first quarter struggles of starting left tackle Nate Solder, demonstrated clearly how much difference Brady makes with his sharp decision-making and quick release.
On several running plays to Solder's side of the Patriot line, Solder and his mates were completely overwhelming by the aggressive charge of the Redskins linebackers. For the game, the Patriots were only able to manage a total of 63 rushing yards. Brady's ability to get out of doomed plays at the lien of scrimmage and audible to take advantage of an aggressive opponent was no where in sight.
But it was two first quarter pass plays that demonstrated how much Solder and the Patriots really rely on Brady's savvy. On the first play, outside linebacker Brian Orakpo faked an outside move, then ducked inside to pressure backup quarterback Ryan Mallett. Instead of sensing the rush and drifting to his left to create a better angle for Solder, as Brady has done hundreds of times throughout his 15 year career, Mallett, stood focused only on his receivers, leaving Solder with the option of hauling Orakpo down from behind, which he did for an obvious holding penalty, or letting Mallett get crushed.
On the next series, Mallett felt some pressure from a hard charge by left linebacker Ryan Kerrigan as he reached the top of his drop -- even though Kerrigan was being effectively blocked. Still, Mallett reacted by taking several quick steps forward in the pocket, right into the awaiting grasp of Orakpo with Solder positioned to keep Orakpo away from the original drop spot but not from the re-positioned Mallett.
With Brady in command of the offense, neither the hold nor the sack would have likely taken place, and the game announcers wouldn't have been spending so much of their commentary pointing out what a tough first quarter it was for Nate Solder.
And with a typical attacking Belichick defense, the post game talk of the depth of the Redskins backfield, featuring six running backs who all ripped off chunk plays either on the ground or through the air, wouldn't have been a major post-game storyline either.
Without Brady's quick release and surgical precision from the pocket, and Belichick's innovative defensive schemes that so often limit the attack options of the opposition, a SuperBowl contender like the Patriots didn't evening look ordinary in this preseason affair -- they looked completely over-matched.
Washington dominated the line of scrimmage on both sides of the ball, piling up nearly 200 yards rushing. Unlike what would unfold in a regular season match-up, the Patriots played the Redskins powerful rushing attach straight up, without any Belichick-inspired wrinkles or blitzes to disrupt their rhythm. The result was being the Redskins moved the ball steadily, accumulating 26 first downs to only 15 for the Patriots, while punting only once over the course of the game.Instead of employing any strategic changes to bolster his team, Belichick seemed content to watch basic one-on-one match ups play out, even as his second and third units weren't showing much of an ability to win these "games within the game."
And while it is certainly true that several key starters on offense, including Brady sat out the entire game, the first quarter struggles of starting left tackle Nate Solder, demonstrated clearly how much difference Brady makes with his sharp decision-making and quick release.
On several running plays to Solder's side of the Patriot line, Solder and his mates were completely overwhelming by the aggressive charge of the Redskins linebackers. For the game, the Patriots were only able to manage a total of 63 rushing yards. Brady's ability to get out of doomed plays at the lien of scrimmage and audible to take advantage of an aggressive opponent was no where in sight.
But it was two first quarter pass plays that demonstrated how much Solder and the Patriots really rely on Brady's savvy. On the first play, outside linebacker Brian Orakpo faked an outside move, then ducked inside to pressure backup quarterback Ryan Mallett. Instead of sensing the rush and drifting to his left to create a better angle for Solder, as Brady has done hundreds of times throughout his 15 year career, Mallett, stood focused only on his receivers, leaving Solder with the option of hauling Orakpo down from behind, which he did for an obvious holding penalty, or letting Mallett get crushed.
On the next series, Mallett felt some pressure from a hard charge by left linebacker Ryan Kerrigan as he reached the top of his drop -- even though Kerrigan was being effectively blocked. Still, Mallett reacted by taking several quick steps forward in the pocket, right into the awaiting grasp of Orakpo with Solder positioned to keep Orakpo away from the original drop spot but not from the re-positioned Mallett.With Brady in command of the offense, neither the hold nor the sack would have likely taken place, and the game announcers wouldn't have been spending so much of their commentary pointing out what a tough first quarter it was for Nate Solder.
And with a typical attacking Belichick defense, the post game talk of the depth of the Redskins backfield, featuring six running backs who all ripped off chunk plays either on the ground or through the air, wouldn't have been a major post-game storyline either.
Wednesday, August 6, 2014
The Beauty of National League Baseball
The strategic beauty of National League baseball was on full display in the sixth and seventh innings of the game on Monday night between the Washington Nationals and the Baltimore Orioles.
If National's catcher Wilson Ramos had just grounded out weakly to second, of lifted a lazy fly to left with two outs in the bottom of the sixth, , rookie manager Matt Williams could of simply given Tanner Roark, the surprise ace of the National's starting staff so far this year, a quick pat on the back and sent him out for the top of the seventh without much fuss.
For sure, Roark didn't seem to have his best stuff going this game, but helped by some stellar defense, he had only allowed 2 runs through six innings against a powerful Orioles lineup.
But Ramos smash a belt high fastball into the right centerfield gap for a clean single, putting runners at the corners with the Nationals holding a tenuous 3-2 lead and Roark due up.
Though Roark isn't one of those pitchers who is a near automatic out at the plate, his average would say that there was a better than 85% that he would strand the runners on base, ending the threat.
Williams didn't seem to hesitate a bit sending Roark to the plate rather then opt to pinch hit, increasing the odds of producing one or more add-on runs. Williams may have been going by the data which clearly showed that any pitch hitter he may have selected to bat for Roark would have only increased the chance of success by 5%-10%. Or he may have just been confident that Roark could hold the Orioles at bay for another inning or two to get to the back end of his bullpen.
Roark did end up hitting a sharp ground ball between first baseman Chris Davis and the bag forcing Davis to make a fine sliding stop, before gathering himself and completing the out at first.
But very quickly, the defensive part of the plan, the part that Williams needed to feel very confident in to leave Roark in the game, unraveled in a very short order. First J.J. Hardy lead off the inning with a double, followed immediately by a game tying double by Ryan Flaherty.
One out later, Roark was out of the game - only to see middle relievers Ross Detwiler and Craig Stammen each allow an RBI single that would make a loser out of Roark and the Nats in this match up each league's Eastern Division leader.
After the game, it was easy for the media and fans to second-guess Williams' decision to let Roark bat – and they most certainly did. And no one knows how things would have worked out if he had sent a pinch hitter to the plate. But that is the beauty of National League baseball. No American League manager is forces to make a tough call like this one, and they probably sleep better at night as a result.
If National's catcher Wilson Ramos had just grounded out weakly to second, of lifted a lazy fly to left with two outs in the bottom of the sixth, , rookie manager Matt Williams could of simply given Tanner Roark, the surprise ace of the National's starting staff so far this year, a quick pat on the back and sent him out for the top of the seventh without much fuss.
For sure, Roark didn't seem to have his best stuff going this game, but helped by some stellar defense, he had only allowed 2 runs through six innings against a powerful Orioles lineup.
But Ramos smash a belt high fastball into the right centerfield gap for a clean single, putting runners at the corners with the Nationals holding a tenuous 3-2 lead and Roark due up.
Though Roark isn't one of those pitchers who is a near automatic out at the plate, his average would say that there was a better than 85% that he would strand the runners on base, ending the threat.
Williams didn't seem to hesitate a bit sending Roark to the plate rather then opt to pinch hit, increasing the odds of producing one or more add-on runs. Williams may have been going by the data which clearly showed that any pitch hitter he may have selected to bat for Roark would have only increased the chance of success by 5%-10%. Or he may have just been confident that Roark could hold the Orioles at bay for another inning or two to get to the back end of his bullpen.
Roark did end up hitting a sharp ground ball between first baseman Chris Davis and the bag forcing Davis to make a fine sliding stop, before gathering himself and completing the out at first.But very quickly, the defensive part of the plan, the part that Williams needed to feel very confident in to leave Roark in the game, unraveled in a very short order. First J.J. Hardy lead off the inning with a double, followed immediately by a game tying double by Ryan Flaherty.
One out later, Roark was out of the game - only to see middle relievers Ross Detwiler and Craig Stammen each allow an RBI single that would make a loser out of Roark and the Nats in this match up each league's Eastern Division leader.
After the game, it was easy for the media and fans to second-guess Williams' decision to let Roark bat – and they most certainly did. And no one knows how things would have worked out if he had sent a pinch hitter to the plate. But that is the beauty of National League baseball. No American League manager is forces to make a tough call like this one, and they probably sleep better at night as a result.
Sunday, July 27, 2014
That's Baseball
One of the great things about baseball is the melding of the obvious and the settle in an intriguing drama in which the key to the action can be easily overlooked by the casual observer. Yestersday's Reds 1-0 victory over the Nationals was the type of game that separates the sports fan from the true baseball fan.
What was obvious early on in this game was that both starting pitchers had brought their A Game to the ballpark, and runs were going to be very precious and hard to come by. By games end, starters Gio Gonzalez and Jonny Cuerto, along with three relievers combined to give up only eight hits while striking out 21 batter.
With this pitching dominance on display for everyone to see, it was two settle developments that turned the tide in favor of the Reds.
But then on the second pitch to the next batter, Brayan Pena, Heisey took off for third in a very crafty move. Heisey hadn't taken a particularly big lead, nor did anything about his body language or movement give any indication of his intent to swipe third. But what he did take advantage of was the lack of peripheral vision a lefthander naturally has with his back toward a running leading off of second. Plus he took the calculated risk, undoubtedly back by scouting reports, that once Gonzalez refocused on home plate after craning his neck to get a glance at Heisey, that he would not take another peek.
With excellent anticipation, Heisey was able to get an early jump allowing him to steal third easily even with an accurate throw from catcher Wilson Ramos.
Teams don't often bring the their infield in as early as the fifth inning of a tie game. But sensing (correctly in my view) that one run might be mighty big the way this game was unfolding, the Nationals infielders all positioned tight to the infield grass hoping to hold Heisey at third. But on the next pitch, a low, inside curveball, Pena was able to make solid contact with a sharp grounder wide of third. While likely playable for a harmless out if third baseman Anthony Rendon was positioned at normal depth, by playing in he couldn't range quickly enough to his left to get his glove on it.
So by taking advantage of a lefty's natural lack of peripheral vision with a runner on second and the split seconds lost in reaction time with the infield in, the Reds were able to produce the only run of the day in a wonderfully pitched game by both teams.
On this day, if you come to the ballpark to see homeruns, you clearly left disappointed. And though even a true baseball fan might not want to see a whole bunch of these 1-0 games, for this one hot Cincinnati afternoon it was a beautiful thing.
Wednesday, July 9, 2014
Ian Desmond - Repeat Offender
In a post a couple of weeks back, I lamented how Ian Desmond's lack of discipline at the plate is sabotaging his five-tool talent - leaving the former All-Star batting around .240 when he his average could easily 30-40 points higher.
Exhibit A was a first inning strikeout against the Astros with runners in scoring position. In that six-pitch at bat, Desmond swung his at each pitch, even though not one of these pitches was even close to being a strike.
Exhibit B on Monday night was even more frustrating to watch, and ended up being the key at bat in what would eventually would become an 8-2 extra inning loss to the Orioles.
With the winning run on second and one out in the bottom of the ninth, Desmond faced a tough sidearming righthander in Darren O'Day. And again he came to the plate hacking away. The first pitch was a fastball over the plate but shoulder height, well out of the strike zone. But that didn't prevent Desmond from taking a futile but vicious swing.
When Desmond stepped out of the box between pitches, it almost looked like he had a bird on each shoulder whispering in each ear. The bird on his right shoulder was telling him to calm down, wait for his pitch and take the ball up the middle for a game winning single. But the bird on the left shoulder was screaming, "swing hard just in case you hit it."
The second pitch was another fastball, at least as high as the first, but this one was inside as well. With the left shoulder prevailing, Desmond took another big, empty hack.
If O'Day wasn't already pitching to a scouting report of Desmond's free-swinging ways, he surely recognized by now that if he didn't make a mistake over the plate, that Desmond would get himself out.
The next two pitches were breaking balls well off the outside corner which Desmond was able to foul off - one squibbing awkwardly off the very tip of his bat.
Exhibit A was a first inning strikeout against the Astros with runners in scoring position. In that six-pitch at bat, Desmond swung his at each pitch, even though not one of these pitches was even close to being a strike.
Exhibit B on Monday night was even more frustrating to watch, and ended up being the key at bat in what would eventually would become an 8-2 extra inning loss to the Orioles.
With the winning run on second and one out in the bottom of the ninth, Desmond faced a tough sidearming righthander in Darren O'Day. And again he came to the plate hacking away. The first pitch was a fastball over the plate but shoulder height, well out of the strike zone. But that didn't prevent Desmond from taking a futile but vicious swing.
When Desmond stepped out of the box between pitches, it almost looked like he had a bird on each shoulder whispering in each ear. The bird on his right shoulder was telling him to calm down, wait for his pitch and take the ball up the middle for a game winning single. But the bird on the left shoulder was screaming, "swing hard just in case you hit it."
The second pitch was another fastball, at least as high as the first, but this one was inside as well. With the left shoulder prevailing, Desmond took another big, empty hack.
If O'Day wasn't already pitching to a scouting report of Desmond's free-swinging ways, he surely recognized by now that if he didn't make a mistake over the plate, that Desmond would get himself out.
The next two pitches were breaking balls well off the outside corner which Desmond was able to foul off - one squibbing awkwardly off the very tip of his bat.
Pitch number five was again outside, but close enough that most batters in protection mode would offer at. Desmond waved again on this fifth consecutive swing on what would have been "ball five" leaving our "Mighty Casey" heading back to the dugout, mumbling to himself in frustration as the Nats best chance to pull out a victory in this taunt well-played pitchers duel, vanished into the warm night.
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| A frustrated Desmond heads back to the dugout |
Monday, June 30, 2014
The New York Yankees: Who are These Guys!!!
I have to admit that I haven't been paying close attention to the box scores lately. So over my breakfast of yogurt and fruit this morning, it was a bit of a shock to see the Yankees had used six pitchers last night, and I had never heard of a single one of them.
As far as I know, Whitley, Kelley, Huff, Betances, Ramirez and Thornton just as easily could be the name of a Wall Street law firm as the outfit that gave up 8 earned runs to the Red Sox in an 8-5 loss.
Just five years ago, when the Yankees were winning the 27th World Series title in their long and decorated history, they were lead by familiar starting pitchers with names like Sabathia, Burnett, Pettitte, and Chamberlain, with win after win being secured by the always reliable Mariano Rivera locking down the ninth inning and occasionally at least part of the eighth as well.
The Yankees will certainly need to pick up their winning pace considerably to allow "The Firm" to become household names beyond the five Burroughs -- and perhaps even within them.
Glancing at the top portion of the box score, I was welcomed by the comfort of a whole bunch familiar names including the likes of Jeter, Beltran, Roberts and Suzuki. But a quick check revealed that each of these four stalwarts is either pushing, or has already pushed past age 40. And though two are sure-fire Hall-of-Famers, with a possible third in Beltran, they are all decidedly well-past their prime.
With Rivera at long last calling an end to his first-ballot Hall-of-Fame career, maybe this truly is the end of an era. Perhaps the many years of buying up the big name free agents and trading youth for veterans to win now is finally taking its toll. Or perhaps some of these "no names" will lead the Yankees back to greatness.
But another glance quickly reveals that three of the six no-name pitchers is sporting an ERA of 4.70 or higher, so the odds seem decidedly against it. And against the Yankees revisiting their glory days anytime soon.
As far as I know, Whitley, Kelley, Huff, Betances, Ramirez and Thornton just as easily could be the name of a Wall Street law firm as the outfit that gave up 8 earned runs to the Red Sox in an 8-5 loss.
Just five years ago, when the Yankees were winning the 27th World Series title in their long and decorated history, they were lead by familiar starting pitchers with names like Sabathia, Burnett, Pettitte, and Chamberlain, with win after win being secured by the always reliable Mariano Rivera locking down the ninth inning and occasionally at least part of the eighth as well.
The Yankees will certainly need to pick up their winning pace considerably to allow "The Firm" to become household names beyond the five Burroughs -- and perhaps even within them.
Glancing at the top portion of the box score, I was welcomed by the comfort of a whole bunch familiar names including the likes of Jeter, Beltran, Roberts and Suzuki. But a quick check revealed that each of these four stalwarts is either pushing, or has already pushed past age 40. And though two are sure-fire Hall-of-Famers, with a possible third in Beltran, they are all decidedly well-past their prime.
With Rivera at long last calling an end to his first-ballot Hall-of-Fame career, maybe this truly is the end of an era. Perhaps the many years of buying up the big name free agents and trading youth for veterans to win now is finally taking its toll. Or perhaps some of these "no names" will lead the Yankees back to greatness.
But another glance quickly reveals that three of the six no-name pitchers is sporting an ERA of 4.70 or higher, so the odds seem decidedly against it. And against the Yankees revisiting their glory days anytime soon.
Nationals: It's Time to Trade Stephen Strasburg
Nationals GM Mike Rizzo probably hasn't spent a minute thinking about this. But between now and the July 31 trade deadline, his #1 priority should be pulling off a blockbuster trade featuring Stephen Strasburg.
It has long been assumed that the Nationals will not be able to afford to sign both Strasburg and Jordan Zimmermann to long-term deals, and it would be Zimmermann who would eventually end up elsewhere. But it is becoming clearer with each start that Zimmermann is the keeper.
After the much-hyped Strasburg, was drafted 1.1 in 2009, he immediately demonstrated why he would become and All-Star with a fastball consistently hitting 97-99 MPH, a developing change-up, and knee-buckling curve.
And post-Tommy John surgery in 2010, both his change-up and-the curve ball have gotten nothing but better. But his signature fastball hasn't regained the velocity or the movement, now sitting in the 94-96 range. Fastballs with movement at 97+ are almost unhittable, fast balls at 94 without much movement are not.
Even with the arsenal of pitches he now has, Strasburg is a very good pitcher, leading the NL in strikeouts with an ERA hovering around 3.00. But that's the rub. "Very good" may be as good as it gets -- while Zimmerman, with about the same velocity, better movement, and better control may end up being the true ace.
So the time to "sell high" and trade Strasburg.
If Rizzo is open to trade, I'm sure he will get a ton of interest. But here is one trade proposal that might make sense for both teams -- trading Strasburg and Danny Espinosa to Houston for second baseman Jose Altuve and pitcher Dallas Keuchel.
Altuve solves two problems for the Nats, with second base being their weakest everyday position, and leadoff being the weakest position in the lineup. Altuve is pesky on an on-base machine with a .386 OPS so far in 2014 and a more than adequate glove, and Keuchel, though a notch below Strasburg (if he wasn't why would Houston make this deal), is lefty and the Nationals only have one lefthanded starter in Gio Gonzalez. So he would better balance the Nats starting rotation.
From Houston's prospective, they would be getting a more-proven top of the rotation starter in Strasburg, even if not a true ace for the reasons stated here, who could take a lot of pressure off their developing young staff. And in Espinosa they get a top-notch gloveman for either second base or shortstop with some pop off his bat, though consistent contact and a high-strikeout rate have been a big challenge.
Whether or not this specific trade proposal is doable or the best one available, the best long-term move for Rizzo and the Nats is to commit to Zimmermann instead of Strasburg, and to get good value for Strasburg now to solve the most glaring holes in the Nats lineup.
It has long been assumed that the Nationals will not be able to afford to sign both Strasburg and Jordan Zimmermann to long-term deals, and it would be Zimmermann who would eventually end up elsewhere. But it is becoming clearer with each start that Zimmermann is the keeper.
After the much-hyped Strasburg, was drafted 1.1 in 2009, he immediately demonstrated why he would become and All-Star with a fastball consistently hitting 97-99 MPH, a developing change-up, and knee-buckling curve.
And post-Tommy John surgery in 2010, both his change-up and-the curve ball have gotten nothing but better. But his signature fastball hasn't regained the velocity or the movement, now sitting in the 94-96 range. Fastballs with movement at 97+ are almost unhittable, fast balls at 94 without much movement are not.
Even with the arsenal of pitches he now has, Strasburg is a very good pitcher, leading the NL in strikeouts with an ERA hovering around 3.00. But that's the rub. "Very good" may be as good as it gets -- while Zimmerman, with about the same velocity, better movement, and better control may end up being the true ace.
So the time to "sell high" and trade Strasburg.
If Rizzo is open to trade, I'm sure he will get a ton of interest. But here is one trade proposal that might make sense for both teams -- trading Strasburg and Danny Espinosa to Houston for second baseman Jose Altuve and pitcher Dallas Keuchel.
 | |
| Sell high by trading Strasburg now |
From Houston's prospective, they would be getting a more-proven top of the rotation starter in Strasburg, even if not a true ace for the reasons stated here, who could take a lot of pressure off their developing young staff. And in Espinosa they get a top-notch gloveman for either second base or shortstop with some pop off his bat, though consistent contact and a high-strikeout rate have been a big challenge.
Whether or not this specific trade proposal is doable or the best one available, the best long-term move for Rizzo and the Nats is to commit to Zimmermann instead of Strasburg, and to get good value for Strasburg now to solve the most glaring holes in the Nats lineup.
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